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BURDENS OF PROOF
FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS.

Edited by Richard

B. Lillich. Ardsley-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1992. xvi
+ 338 pp.
Reviewed by Jose E. Alvarez*

This compilation of papers presented at the University of Virginia's
Eleventh Sokol Colloquium is not, as is duly noted in its preface, a
"comprehensive treatise" on evidentiary issues before international
tribunals. It is, however, according to its editor, "the most thoughtprovoking as well as practical treatment of the subject yet to appear" and
"should become the seminal work" in the field.' These claims are not
fulfilled. This volume does not rise above its symposium origins. Its
fifteen chapters are likely to be equally frustrating to its two intended
readerships: international litigators and academics. This is neither the
nuts and bolts guide nor the comprehensive compendium of evidentiary
rules drawn from practice which international litigators might find useful.'
Neither is it a jurisprudential treatment of interest to those with a more
philosophical bent. Further, its proposals for reform are not particularly
surprising or innovative. The editor's claims are nonetheless plausible in
one sense: this is the most complete reexamination of the subject since
Durward Sandifer's in 1975.' Given the renewed interest and expectations for international adjudication-as well as the relative dearth of
writing (at least in English) on the subject of how these tribunals engage
in finding facts5 -Fact-Finding Before InternationalTribunals is likely

* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University, National Law Center.
The author expresses his gratitude to the Law Center's Dean Jack Friedenthal whose
generous summer research program made this review possible and to readers Lucy Reed and
Susan Damplo for their helpful suggestions.
1. FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).
2. Id.
3. Compare, for example, some of the prior work of some of the authors here which can
provide more practical hands-on guidance. See, e.g., Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court, and
the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987); Jamison M. Selby & David P. Stewart,
PracticalAspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 18
INT'L LAW. 211 (1984); Thomas M. Franck & H. Scott Fairley, ProceduralDue Process
in Human Rights Fact-Finding by InternationalAgencies, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 308 (1980).
4. DURWARD SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (rev. ed. 1975).
5. Despite the proliferation of tribunals and cases, particularly in the commercial setting,
there has been little systematic attention to evidentiary issues. Among the articles and books
are Michael Reisman & Eric E. Freedman, The Plaintiff's Dilemma! Illegally Obtained
Evidence and Admissibility in InternationalAdjudication, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (1982);
Anker, The Use of Tribunal Appointed Experts, MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS (Iranian

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 14:399

to be widely cited despite its inadequacies.
The structure of this book is altogether different from Sandifer's
treatment. Sandifer dealt with the subject as if he were rewriting, for the
international litigator, McCormick's6 or Weinstein's 7 respective treatises
on evidence. Sandifer's 1975 edition, an update of his 1939 doctoral
dissertation published under the same title,' is an orderly distillation,
organized around evidentiary principles familiar to domestic lawyers, of
the practice of such bodies as the Permanent Court of Justice, the
International Court of Justice and diverse arbitral tribunals. In grand
hornbook manner, Sandifer purported to present in "systematic and
codified form a statement of the law of evidence as it stands today in
international procedure." 9 Accordingly, Sandifer addressed the "function
and nature" of evidentiary rules, l0 the "order and time of the submission12
of evidence,"" and the rules applied to production and admission,
documentary versus testimonial evidence, 13 ex parte evidence such as16
affidavits,' 4 authentication," evidence by interested persons and hearsay,
and judicial notice. 17 Sandifer's book has been useful to international
practitioners because of its old fashioned claim to completeness; those
who sought to make an advocate's argument on, for example, the
evidentiary weight to be accorded a sovereign's assertions of fact could
find in it a ready reference. There was also comfort in Sandifer's claim

Claims), Mar. 16, 1984, at 254; Colin Tapper, Evidence Reform in an InternationalContext,
22 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 31 (1992); GILLIAN MARY WHITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (1990). See also SANDIFER, supra note 4. There has been
greater attention to procedures within the ICJ. See, e.g., Neill H. Alford, Jr., Fact Finding

by the World Court,4 VILL. L. REV. 37 (1958); Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the
Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987). See generally, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965); SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND
METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984); SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY TO THE 1978 RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE (1983).
6. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3rd ed. 1984).
7. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1992).
8. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at xiii.
9. Id. at xiv.
10. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 1-34.
11. Id. at 46-94.
12. Il at 95-196.
13. Id. at 197-240.
14. Id. at 240-69.
15. Id at 269-84.
16. Id. at 349-81.
17. ld at 382-97.
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that despite the variety of (often ad hoc) tribunals, there has been
doctrinal continuity. Sandifer discerned a harmonious pattern tantamount
to a "customary law of evidence" amidst the clutter of the reported
cases.18
By contrast, Fact-FindingBefore InternationalTribunals is not a
standard reference work, and it lacks a unifying voice to make sense of
the clutter. For the most part, each of the authors of its fifteen chapters
confines himself or herself to a particular international forum or type of
forum. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, the European Court of Justice, administrative tribunals,
human rights tribunals, and other human rights fora are each given
attention in turn. With the exceptions of an all-too short chapter by
Richard Bilder which questions whether "facts" can be so easily
distinguished from the "law," and an essay by Thomas Carbonneau which
critiques many of the recommendations made in the other papers, the
chapters are largely self-contained and show little evidence of crossfertilization. Each author marches to the beat of his or her own drummer,
to the detriment of any possible insights that might apply across the
diverse tribunals discussed. Moreover, due to the limited range of each
author's contribution, when such generalizations are made, they prove to
be of dubious value.
Most of the fifteen chapters of the book are briefly surveyed in Part
I below. The premises of the book come under fire in Parts II and III,
which challenge the book's titular claim that it constitutes a survey of
"fact-finding" by "international tribunals."
I. SYNOPSIS
The major recommendations emerging from Fact-Finding Before
International Tribunals are simply put by Lillich in his preface: that
arbitrators and judges should have some fact-finding expertise, that they
should be more aggressive about finding facts, and that they should avoid
ducking the facts through legal determinations. 9 These themes are
applied to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the first four chapters
by Stephen Schwebel, Thomas Franck, Keith Highet, and Pierre-Marie
Dupuy.
Schwebel, Judge on the International Court of Justice, comments on
"Three Cases of Fact-Finding By the International Court of Justice." The

18. Id. at 457-58.
19. FACT-FINDING

BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS,

supra note 1, at xi.
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21 cases as well as
cases chosen are the well-known ELS12 and Nicaragua
22
the less familiar case of Mr. Yakimetz, a USSR national who, after his
resignation from Soviet government service and a request for asylum in
the United States, was denied continued U.N. employment. While
Schwebel takes issue with the factual conclusions reached by the chamber
deciding the ELSI Case, he praises the chamber's handling of the facts,
and contrasts it with the too timid approach to fact-finding taken by the
full Court in the Nicaraguaand Yakimetz cases. To Schwebel, the latter
cases illustrate the Court's tendency to play only a "passive" role in factfinding, particularly in failing to probe witnesses. Thus, Schwebel
criticizes the Yakimetz Court's failure to reconsider a crucial issue of fact:
the Administrative Tribunal's finding that the Secretary-General had
indeed given reasonable consideration to a career appointment for
Yakimetz. Schwebel also castigates the Nicaragua Court for failing to
probe deeply enough, at the merits phase, El Salvador's claims of
collective self defense, particularly its claim that Nicaragua had been
supplying arms to insurgents in El Salvador. As he did in his dissent in
that case, Schwebel disparages the Court's finding3 that Nicaragua had
never supplied arms to the Salvadoran insurgents.
Thomas Franck, in his chapter on "Fact-Finding in the I.C.J.,"
compares the NicaraguaCourt's handling of the facts to the Court's factfinding in three other instances: the Miniquiers and Ecrehos24 case, the
Temple of Preah Vihear,25 and the advisory opinion in the Western

20. Elettronica Sincula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20)
[hereinafter ELSI Case] (involving U.S. allegations that the requisition by Italian authorities
of a factory, whose operating company's stock was wholly owned by U.S. companies, was
in violation of a 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Italy and
the United States.
21. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case] (involving Nicaraguan claims of U.S.
activity or sponsorship of activity in and around Nicaragua).
22. Application for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18 (Advisory Opinion of May 27) (in which a USSR national who,
after his resignation from Soviet government service and a request for asylum in the United
States, was denied continued U.N. employment).
23. See also Nicaragua Case, 1987 I.C.J., at 330-31 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Schwebel).
24. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17) (concerning
a dispute between France and Great Britain over two land masses in the English Channel).
25. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15) (concerning
a determination of the Thai-Cambodian border and an assessment of the relevance of cliffs
and a watershed for purposes of a boundary).
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Sahara.26
Franck's thesis is that all these cases illustrate
the Court's desire to bypass "real" fact-finding through various stratagems, such as reliance on a paper record or reliance on legal rules that
make the resolution of controverted issues of fact irrelevant. To Franck,
the risks inherent to the Court's approach become apparent in the majority
opinion in the NicaraguaCase which minimized the significance of key
factual findings by suggesting that Nicaraguan intervention in the El
Salvadoran civil war, had it occurred, would not in any case have entitled
the United States to respond in kind. Franck claims this controversial
reading of international law suggests "expansive law-making in lieu of
narrower decisions based mainly on the facts," unduly favors litigant
regimes who can stop their citizens from going to the Hague to testify,
and produces "incredible" findings of fact which only undermine the
credibility of the Court once the truth emerges.27 For these reasons,
Franck, echoing a theme noted by other contributors to this volume,
advocates further study of the ways in which the Court can strengthen its
fact-finding abilities.
The next chapter, by Keith Highet, counsel to Italy in the ELSI Case,
uses that case to puncture the "myth" that the ICJ is constitutionally
unable to handle complex fact-finding in a commercial setting. Highet
praises "the broad scope and substantial depth of the fact-finding"
accomplished by the ELSI Chamber and finds "exemplary" the "exceeding care with which it picked its way through complex, contradictory, and
sometimes misleading facts and evidence ....

"

Highet finds little to

criticize regarding the Chamber's handling of the burden of proof and
specific types of evidence and concludes that the chamber approach is so
congenial to the handling of commercial matters that the Court should
consider forming a specialized chamber to handle these matters. 29 By
way of reform, he suggests that parties be permitted to agree in advance
to "general principles concerning the method and manner of production
of evidence," including provisions for time saving devices such as
depositions and written interrogatories.3"

26. Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (concerning whether
the Western Sahara was terra nullis at the time of the Spanish colonization and, if not, a
determination of the legal relationship between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity).
27. Thomas M. Franck, Fact-Finding in the LC.J., in FACT-FINDING BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 21, 31 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).
28. Keith Highet, Evidence, the Chamber and the ELSI Case, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).
29. Id. at 74.
30. Id. at 61.
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Pierre-Marie Dupuy next focuses on the Court's 1986 judgment in the
Case Concerning the FrontierDispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali). 31 Like
Highet, he uses that Chamber decision to illustrate the Court's approach
to evidentiary issues, particularly its faithfulness to the classical view that
"maps cannot, by themselves, have any legal value." 32 Dupuy briefly
canvasses the Chamber's attempt to answer a key factual issue: what had
been the delimitation between the French Sudan and Upper Volta when
both of these territories were placed under French governmental
authority? While Dupuy argues that the Chamber in this case adhered to
the "classical principles established by earlier international jurisprudence, 33 and carefully mastered the difficult facts before it, he suggests
that the Chamber was asked to find a boundary line which may have
never existed in reality and that in doing so, it may have responded to the
parties' wishes more as an equitable arbitral body than as a court of law.34
The two chapters addressing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
authored by Howard Holtzmann, presently a judge on the Tribunal, and
Jamison Selby, the former U.S. Deputy Agent to the Tribunal, are more
broadly focused than the three chapters on the ICJ. Holtzmann provides
a Sandifer-like overview of the Tribunal's evidentiary practice to date.
He begins by addressing key provisions of the UNCITRAL rules 35 (as
modified by the Tribunal) including the emphasis on early production of
the documentary evidence and the rule permitting the Tribunal to appoint
experts who may be cross-examined by the parties.36 He then uses two
tribunal decisions concerning the proof needed to show U.S. corporate
nationality, the famous orders in Flexi-Van and General Motors,37 to
illustrate what Holtzmann describes as the Tribunal's "high-watermark"
of judicial activism regarding evidentiary issues. To Holtzmann the

31. Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec.
22).
32. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Fact-Finding in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute
(Burkina Faso/Republicof Mali), in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 81,
88-89 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).

33. ld. at 92.
34. Id. at 91, 93.
35. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on April 28, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
36. Howard M. Holtzmann, Fact-Findingby the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal, in
FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 101, 102-04 (Richard B. Lillich ed.,
1992) (citing UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, arts. 18, 19, 15 and 27).
37. Order of December 20, 1982, reprinted in Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 455 (1982); Order of January 21, 1983,
reprinted in General Motors Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 3 IRANU.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 1 (1983).
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creativity shown by the Chamber in these instances-including its use of
publicly available proxy statements to show the numbers of U.S.
shareholders, the taking of judicial notice concerning statistics on the
extent of foreign ownership within publicly owned companies in the
United States, and the drawing of inferences based on this information in
the absence of rebuttal evidence to show non-U.S. ownership-admirably
resolved what would otherwise have been a massive fact-finding
dilemma.3 8 Holtzmann cites other instances of the Tribunal's flexible
approach to fact-finding, an approach he praises as responsive to the need
to expedite case processing, to compensate for the difficulty one party
may have in obtaining certain types of evidence particularly in postrevolutionary Iran, or to maintain business confidentiality. Holtzmann
also deals with issues long familiar to readers of Sandifer, including the
handling of statements by interested parties (admissible as "representatives" of a party, with appropriate weight to be determined by the
tribunal), remedies for failure to produce (drawing an adverse inference,
with tribunal orders to compel discovery sometimes rendered for very
specific requests), and the admissibility of expert evidence (reliance on
tribunal-appointed experts). Holtzmann concludes by providing the same
comfort as Sandifer: these rules are "not sui generis, but are rather a
likely source of guidance in other arbitrations.,, 39 Like Sandifer, he sees
this as an exercise "incomparative procedural law" with clear evidentiary
patterns emerging between fora faced with similar circumstances. Like
Highet, Franck, and Schwebel, Holtzmann recommends that arbitrators
take an activist role in fact-finding, guiding the parties to the proper
evidence rather than relying on what the parties choose to present.
Jamison Selby echoes many of the same points. She examines the
arbitrator's role under the UNCITRAL rules ("not only judge and jury,
but also judge of the first instance and final appeal")' as well as relevant
tribunal procedures including the use of pre-hearing conferences, orders
38. In those instances Chamber One of the Tribunal indicated that affidavits by
corporate officers were insufficient to show the elements needed to demonstrate U.S.
corporate nationality, namely, incorporation in the United States and a showing that,
collectively, natural persons who were U.S. citizens held 50% or more of the stock of the
corporation continuously from the date the claim arose until the date the Claims Settlement
Declaration (which established the Tribunal) came into force. Instead of dismissing these
claims for failure to state a claim, Chamber One indicated what evidence would establish
a prima facie showing of U.S. corporate nationality. See Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 455; General Motors Corp. v. Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 3 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 1.
39. Holtzmann, supra note 36, at 132.
40. Jamison M. Selby, Fact-FindingBefore the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
The View From the Trenches, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 135,
137 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).
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to clarify the proof needed or to mandate production, short, simplified
hearings, the acceptance of affidavits and live witnesses, and the
questioning of witnesses. She draws the same general conclusions as
Sandifer regarding the unique features of international arbitration that lead
to liberal admission of evidence and a strong presumption against
"technical" exclusionary rules." For Selby, this liberality relates to an
arbitral decision's ultimate legitimacy:
The creation of an international tribunal, or the decision to refer a
dispute to such a tribunal-particularly by sovereign States-is a
relatively major undertaking, a last resort for a dispute which must be
finally resolved. In this context, the resolution of the dispute is only
"final," in a political if not legal sense, if the parties accept it as final,
while a decision turning on technical rules of evidence or procedure
seems generally to be perceived as unsatisfactory. The ultimate decision
will derive more acceptable weight from the perception that it rests on
legal authority, factual accuracy, or, at least, fairness. 42
This insight leads Selby to suggest that the absence of "technical" rules
of exclusion should not be equated with maintaining unfettered discretion
for the arbitrator. In fact, she suggests that uncertainty regarding the
applicable rules of evidence may lead to unnecessary surprise for the
parties. Accordingly, she argues that there is a need for "supplementary
rules of evidence and procedure," including means to more effectively
compel evidence, in order to enhance the credibility of arbitral decisions.43 Charles Brower, in a subsequent chapter, agrees with this
sentiment but would apply it not to the production or admission of
evidence but instead to the evaluation of evidence already admitted. He
suggests that we are seeing the emergence of a lex evidentia embracing
common principles for the evaluation of evidence by international
tribunals and proposes that these rules be compiled.
Georg Ress' examination of "Fact-finding at the European Court of
Justice" also comes to the conclusion that this court, despite powers given
to it under its rules of procedure, has, at least through the first thirty years
of its existence, generally avoided or used only sparingly its extensive

41. Compare SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 176 ("the history of international arbitration
shows that whatever may be the merits of the Strict Common Law rules regulating the
admissibility and burden of proof, it is not practicable to follow them in international
litigation.) (quoting Lauterpacht) and Selby, supra note 40, at 141-42 ("[The Iran-U.S.
Claims] Tribunal practice developed in the direction of liberally admitting evidence, despite
more restrictive, albeit differently restrictive, rules of civil and common law systems. This
approach is consistent with ... the traditional practice of international tribunals to admit
virtually anything").
42. Selby, supra note 40, at 143.

43. Id. at 145.
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powers to request information and production, appoint experts, and hear
oral testimony. 44 He suggests that the European Court has employed a
mix of accusatorial or inquisitorial techniques. He then details the
Court's approach to fact-finding in the various types of proceedings over
which the court has jurisdiction: actions for annulment of decisions or
recommendations taken by the European Commission; claims for
reduction of penalties imposed by the Commission (primarily pecuniary
sanctions for infringement of competition law); and, in connection with
antidumping procedures, preliminary ruling proceeding by national courts
interpreting the EEC Treaty, the validity of Community acts, or the
interpretation of certain Council statutes. Ress concludes with a look at
the recent (1989) establishment of the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities. Ress' survey suggests that the European Court's
fact-finding practice throughout these various types of actions is difficult
to categorize; whereas the Court usually defers to others' fact-finding in
antidumping cases, it need not and does not defer to national courts'
findings of facts in the course of at least some requests for preliminary
rulings.45
C.F. Amerasinghe's review of the "Problems of Evidence Before
International Administrative Tribunals" largely focuses on these tribunals'
reactions to "confidential" evidence and the appointment of experts. He
concludes that in the majority of cases dealing with private litigants'
claims for disclosure of "confidential" documents held by organizations,
administrative tribunals have found ways to refuse these requests for
production.46 Amerasinghe also concludes that these tribunals have
assumed the inherent power to use or appoint experts even in the absence
of provision in their statutes, and have not hesitated to use experts or to
evaluate expert findings. 47
The book's final four chapters deal with fora for the resolution of
human rights disputes. Jochen A. Frowein, writing on the European
Commission of Human Rights, finds that the Commission primarily relies
on documentary evidence and has not frequently heard live witnesses.
Moreover, the nature and extent of questioning of these live witnesses in
those few instances in which this occurred has varied "according to the

44. Georg Ress, Fact-Finding at the European Court of Justice, in FACT-FINDING
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 177, 183 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).

45. Id. at 191-92, 197.
46. C.F. Amerasinghe, Problems of Evidence Before International Administrative
Tribunals, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 210-22 (Richard B. Lillich

ed., 1992).
47. Id. at 223, 232.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 14:399

48
specific national traditions which may have influenced a procedure."'
Frowein also briefly considers the special problems associated with visits
by Commission delegates to such sites as military detention centers,
suggests that the standard of proof employed ("beyond a reasonable
doubt") should not be regarded as identical to the Anglo-Saxon standard
for criminal cases or its special evidentiary rules, and closes with a brief
look at the burden of proof 49 Tom Farer does the same for the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights, focusing on, among other
things, the arguments in favor of the Commission's long-established
practice of drawing an adverse inference from a government's failure to
produce evidence required under the American Convention of Human
Rights.
Thomas Buergenthal's look at the Inter-American Human Rights
Court surveys the evidentiary rules emerging from that Court's meager,
but growing, case law. Buergenthal argues that any simple statement
concerning whether that Court is an appellate body or one which sits in
de novo review of facts found by the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights is likely to be misleading. He contends that while the
American Convention and the Court's statute anticipated that the
Commission would primarily undertake fact-finding, in fact the InterAmerican Court is free to perform the functions of a trial court, as it did
in the Honduran DisappearanceCases, when the necessary fact-finding
does not take place or is inadequate.50 Buergenthal argues that the InterAmerican Court has been more influenced by the evidentiary rules
applied by the International Court of Justice than by the European Court
of Human Rights (which generally has been able to leave fact-finding to
the European Commission). Buergenthal also argues that the InterAmerican Commission ideally should follow the European example since
it is better equipped than the Inter-American Court for fact-finding, but
that the Court will continue to assume this role in the absence of
thorough and impartial findings by the Commission. Buergenthal also
canvasses the Inter-American Court's innovative decision in the Disappearance Cases to shift the burden of going forward with proof to the

48. Jochen A. Frowein, Fact-Findingby the European Commission of Human Rights,
in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 242 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).

49. The burden of proof is on the Commission to establish the truth, with the State party
required to furnish "all necessary assistance." Id. at 242.
50. Thomas Buergenthal, Judicial Fact-Finding: The Inter-American Human Rights
Court, in FAT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 261, 264 (Richard B. Lillich

ed., 1992). See, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 4 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) (July 29,
1988); Godinez Cruz Case, 5 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) (Jan. 20, 1989); Fairen Garbi and
Solis Corrales Case, 6 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) (Mar. 15, 1989).
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respondent State once the claimant had established that there existed both
a governmental practice of causing the disappearances of individuals and
To
a link between the particular individual and the practice."
Buergenthal, this creation of a rebuttable presumption regarding the
disappearance of an individual who may have been last seen in the hands
of a government which has caused the disappearance of other individuals
obviously puts the burden on the party best able to prove the fact, solves
an evidentiary dilemma, and can easily be applied to other issues in other
human rights contexts. Buergenthal also surveys other aspects of the
Disappearance Cases, including the Court's rejection of arguments
challenging the admissibility of the testimony of certain "disloyal"
witnesses, its rejection of the applicability of domestic evidentiary rules,
and its holding that a finding of the existence of a governmental policy
of disappearances requires a standard of proof "capable of establishing the
truth of the allegations in a convincing manner,"' 2 and not merely proof
by a preponderance of the evidence. Like many of the other authors in
this collection, Buergenthal argues that there is a need for a "model set
of rules of evidence and related rules of procedure for the use of
international tribunals" since the current ad hoc approach creates
confusion and probably unfairness.5 3
The final two chapters address fact-finding not by international
tribunals but by nongovernmental human rights organizations (NGOs) and
national governments acting in the human rights area. Hurst Hannum
addresses the very different purposes and intended audiences of NGO
activities since their goal is not to prepare a case for a formal hearing
before an international court. He concludes with some recommendations
to improve the reliability and accuracy of NGO fact-finding, including the
identification of sources, the clarification of roles (watchdog/impartial
fact-finder/political advocate), and the willingness to apply standards
evenhandedly.
Finally, David A. Martin surveys the techniques for fact-finding
employed by national governments and critiques fact-finding in asylum
determination cases heard before the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). Martin argues that BIA asylum determinations evince the same
tendency to opt for legal resolutions over factual determinations which
Franck sees evident in ICJ cases, and he contends that this leads to

51. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 4 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) para. 125.
52. Buergenthal, supra note 50, at 271, citing Godinez Cruz Case, 5 INTER-Am. CT.
H.R. (ser. C) para. 150; (Fairen Garbi & Solis Corrales Case, 6 INTER-Am. CT. H.R. (ser.
C) para. 132.
53. Buergenthal, supra note 50, at 274.
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erroneous denials of asylum.
II. FAULT-FINDING "FACT-FINDING"

The title of this book suggests one of its shortcomings. As Richard
Bilder suggests in his brief (three page) chapter, the very notion that
"fact-finding" is a neatly compartmentalized aspect of judicial activity has
long been subject to challenge for a variety of reasons, not the least of
which is that most (some would say all) issues worth addressing are
mixed questions of fact and law.5 4 By contrast, the very premise of this
book, indeed the starting point of almost every chapter except Bilder's,
is reminiscent of Sandifer's charmingly old-fashioned first sentence to his
1975 work: "[t]he primary concern of this study is the process or mode
of presenting evidence before international tribunals rather than the
determination of what constitutes evidence." 5 5 Much of modern
scholarship, whether in the field of evidence or otherwise, is devoted to
showing the difficulties of any such demarcations. As Bilder suggests,
the more important question may not be what the bulk of the chapters in
this book concern themselves with-how courts find "facts"--but why
they feel compelled to make the fact/law distinction in the first place. As
Bilder and others who have examined the issue in terms of domestic
courts have suggested, domestic courts feel a special need to make a
distinction between "facts" and "law" because they need to give judges
and juries something different to do, to give trial courts something
different to do than appellate courts, to restrain the potential abuse of
or to
power by judges vis-a-vis other co-equal branches of government,
5 6
determinations
of
kinds
different
of
effect
limit the precedential

54. Richard B. Bilder, The Fact/Law Distinctionin InternationalAdjudication, in FACTFINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 95, 95-98 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992).
Carbonneau, in his chapter, also argues that "[a]djudication includes an irreducible
normative and subjective dimension at every stage of its operation that transforms all
considerations into mixed questions of fact and law." Thomas E. Carbonneau, Darknessand
Light in the Shadows of International Arbitral Adjudication, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 158 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1992). As one of the contributors
to this volume put it in another context, "[1]awyers know that there are few 'pure' facts."
Franck & Fairley, supra note 3, at 309. See also Walter Wheeler Cook, "Facts" and
"Statements of Fact," 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1936-37); Kim L. Scheppele, Facing Facts
in Legal Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 42 (1990); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 183 (1893); Nathan Isaacs, The
Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-13 (1922); A.W.B. Simpson, The Analysis of
Legal Concepts, 80 LAW Q. REV. 535, 535-58 (1964); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions
of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 111-22 (1923-24); George C. Christie, Judicial
Review of Findingsof Fact, 87 Nw. UNIV. L. REv.14 (1992).
55. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 1.
56. Bilder, supra note 54, at 96; See also, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 54.
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Unexamined in this book is the question Bilder raises but does not
answer: whether international tribunals face the same or comparable need
to make the fact/law distinction. On the one hand, one could suggest that
international tribunals do not face as great a need to make the fact/law
distinction because they need not worry about a jury, an appellate court
structure, or, arguably, 7 the effects of precedent. If so, the importance
of the issues addressed by the other contributors to this volume,
particularly the significance attached by many to strengthened "fact"
finding, becomes dubious. Alternatively, one could argue that given the
international legal system's exceptional need to maintain the fragile
legitimacy of international adjudication, the fact/law distinction-and factfinding generally-assumes an even greater importance among international tribunals. On this view, the fact/law distinction serves somewhat
different ends for international tribunals: it creates or perpetuates a
perception that the process is fair, impartial, and thorough. It is, in the
end, this perception of fairness that permits the tribunal's conclusions to
be given effect. 58 As some fact/law critics would put it, an international
tribunal's finding of the "facts," when credibly done, provides, as does
an account rendered by a domestic appellate court, a conclusive determination which resonates both as an account of what "actually" happened
and as a narrative which fits into generalized legal categories.59
The book fails to address such fundamental theoretical questions,
despite their relevance to the subject at hand. Thus, Franck's and
Schwebel's two-prong attack on the Nicaragua Court's fact-finding is
essentially that there was too little fact-finding and what there was of it
was poorly done. The assumption both authors make is most clearly put
by another author in this collection: "that the law can only be applied
wisely when the facts are first clearly established."'
Undiscussed by
either is the extent to which the Court's and the parties' views of the
relevant "law" helped to determine the "factual" findings and, whether

57. The argument would be that the ICJ, for example, need not concern itself with
precedent given the interpretation of article 59 of its statute which suggests that it is not
subject to a doctrine of stare decisis. Of course, article 59 may only mean that a case is
only resjudicataas between parties to a case. As for other tribunals, nothing in article 38
of the Statute of the Court authorizes giving their decisions a stare decisis effect; judicial
decisions provide at most evidence of what the other sources of law mean or contain. In
these respects international tribunals are less concerned with the precedential effects of their

decisions. Of course, this assumes that all such tribunals are alike, a view challenged infra
at discussion accompanying notes 66-73.
58. To this extent, the fact/law distinction serves the same legitimizing purpose as the
presumption against technical exclusion of evidence. See Selby, supra note 40, at 141-43.
59. See Scheppele, supra note 54, at 63.
60. Dupuy, supra note 32, at 93.
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given the legal categories, a call for further "factual" probing by the
Court would have made much difference. The brief one-sided views
presented here concerning the Nicaragua Case fail to do justice to the
6
complexity of either the merits decision in that case, ' or to the variety of
62
views that have been expressed concerning it.
More generally the ICJ chapters do not address the mixed fact/law
findings that pervade the World Court's opinions under both its contentious and advisory jurisdictions. What would the contributors to this
volume make of the Court's determination, made in the course of the
Fisheries Case, 63 that economic interests, among other things, should be
a general "consideration" in determining whether a state's delimitation of
its territorial sea is lawful? Although this ruling has been cited as part
of the substantive law, as have the requisites for a lawful claim of
6
prescription enunciated in the Eastern Greenland Case,' both also
constitute determinations of what evidence was relevant to prove the
underlying claims in the respective cases. Both courts' descriptions of
the "facts" were obviously colored by these determinations. One can
multiply the examples manyfold. Are the rules regarding the materials
one can properly consider in the interpretation of treaties, often cited in
the Court's practice, 65 more properly viewed as rules of substantive law
or evidentiary rules? What about the use of the institutional practice of
an international organization to determine the meaning of a Charter
provision?'
Similar issues arise in connection with human rights tribunals.
61. The Franck and Schwebel chapters do not address "fact" findings by the Nicaragua
Court far more favorable to the United States, such as the Court's crucial finding that
actions of the Nicaraguan Contras could not be attributed to the United States. Nicaragua
Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 314-16. Nor do they address those findings by the Court-such as its
finding that the United States mined harbors without warning to international shipping or
distributed a manual which called for acts in violation of the laws of war-which would
appear to ground liability quite apart from the findings these authors do address. Id. at
316-18.
62. See, e.g., Fernando R. Tes6n, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v.
United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987).
63. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
64. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 at 22 (Apr. 5).
65. Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980), cited in Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53
(Nov. 12).
66. Compare, e.g., Judge Spender's views on the relevance of institutional practice to
the Charter interpretation in Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
184-97 (July 20) (separate opinion of Judge Spender), with Judge Alvarez' views in
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
1950 I.C.J. 4, 15-19, 23-24 (March 3) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez).
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Buergenthal's discussion of the shifting burdens of proof in the Disappearance Cases in this volume, as well as other commentators' analyses
of these cases elsewhere, 67 suggest the interrelated nature of the various
evidentiary, procedural, and substantive law determinations in those cases.
Thus, the Inter-American Court's "evidentiary" decisions as to the degree
of proof required in this type of case ("convincing" but not "beyond a
reasonable doubt" 68), the scope of admissibility (going beyond material
formally submitted by the parties), reliance on circumstantial evidence,
and the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement (theoretical
availability of local remedies not enough) are inextricably linked to its
interpretation of the substantive legal requirements under the American
Convention of Human Rights. Discussions of these and other evidentiary
issues in human rights fora solely under the rubric of "fact"-finding is at
best misleading.
The problematic fact/law distinction is evident in the Iran-United
States Tribunal as well. The Tribunal's dual nationality cases, not
discussed in this volume, illustrate the problem well. The case of Ms.
Shahnaz Mohajer-Shojaee, one of the claimants in the Tribunal's award
of October 5, 1990, decided by Chamber One, is instructive. The tribunal
majority summarily dismissed Ms. Mohajer-Shojaee's claim on the basis
that she had failed to prove that she was dominantly and effectively a
United States national.69 The claimant had presented a U.S. passport
issued Nov. 28, 1977, documentary evidence that she was a resident of
the United States at least as of 1972, and affidavits of her husband
indicating that she had been a U.S. resident since 1969. Chamber One
found this evidence, in the absence of additional documentary evidence,
insufficient to prove U.S. nationality. The U.S. judge, Judge Holtzmann,
one of the contributors to this volume, dissented in part, indicating that
documentary evidence is generally required to establish naturalization
because the official documents are readily available but that the other
elements of dominant and effective nationality, including proof of

67. See, e.g., Dinah L. Shelton, JudicialReview of State Action by International Courts,
12 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 361 (1989); Linda Drucker, Governmental Liabilityfor "Disappearances": A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 289 (1989).

68. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 4 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) para. 129, 134.
69. Under the Algiers accords, as interpreted by many cases before the Tribunal,
claimants who are nationals of both the United States and Iran under those countries'
respective laws may still present claims against Iran provided they establish they have
dominant and effective U.S. nationality from the date their claim arose to Jan. 19, 1981.
See Case No. A18, 5 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 251 (1984); Mohajer-Shojaee v. Iran, 25
IRAN-U.S. CL. TRaB. REP. 196 (1990).
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residence and center of interests, may be demonstrated by affidavit
evidence.7" He further argued that threshold proof of naturalization
creates a presumption of dominant and effective nationality flowing from
the naturalization oath and he concluded that "proof of naturalization,
when coupled with proof of prolonged residence in the United States,
invariably leads to a conclusion in favor of dominant U.S. nationality,
absent other compelling circumstances."7 For these reasons, Holtzmann
contended that Ms. Mohajer-Shojaee had made an unrebutted prima facie
showing that her habitual residence and family ties were in the United
States since 1969 and that she therefore had standing to bring a claim.
Significantly, later dual nationality cases decided in Chamber One of the
tribunal have seemingly adopted Holtzmann's test.72 It is clear that
Holtzmann's dissent appeared to make Chamber One more willing to
consider the merits of claims brought by dual nationals. Yet the
categorization of this change in the caselaw of the Tribunal is not simple.
Is it a change in the Tribunal's growing substantive law regarding
dominant and effective nationality, a "mere" change in its evidentiary
rules favoring the types of evidence which benefit these claimants, or
both? In the end we are left with a mixed fact/law holding which has
transformed some persons holding dual nationalities into dominantly U.S.
nationals in later cases.
The Tribunal's approach in the dual nationality cases, as in the
corporate nationality cases which Holtzmann discussed in this volume,
appears to cast the question more in evidentiary terms: as a change in the
burdens of proof or in terms of shifting presumptions. Whether this is
the view outside observers ought to take of it-whether this question
should be seen as part of "fact" finding or "law" finding-remains very
much in doubt, yet is outside the purview of this book. This is so despite
the fact that several chapters here, including Franck's and Martin's,
inadvertently supply abundant evidence of the skill with which courts,
both international and domestic, manipulate the fact/law distinction to
achieve desired results. In these cases, as in others in this volume, the
authors simply choose one side of the chicken/egg proposition without
inquiring into the significance of the game being played, or even
acknowledging that a game is being played at all. Yet possibly more

70.
opinion
71.
72.

Mohajer-Shojaee v. Iran, 25 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 197, 202-10 (separate
of Judge Holtzmann).
Id. at 205.
See, e.g., Monemi v. Iran, Award No. 533-274-1, (July 1, 1992); Etezadi v. Iran, 25

IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 264 (1990); Riahi v. Iran, Award No. ITL 80-485-1 (June 10,
1992).
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significant than the ways the tribunals categorize these issues is the
question of whether these categorizations really matter for purposes of
precedent.
Beyond ignoring the difficulties with the fact/law distinction, the
commentators here also ignore the fundamental issue of whether all
international tribunal decisions, especially arbitrations and ICJ decisions
involving determinations of territorial and boundary disputes, necessarily
involve the application of "law" at all.73 In this volume, Pierre-Marie
Dupuy finds in the Burkina Faso case "an application of equity, lato
sensu," but blithely dismisses this as a debate for another day (and
presumably another book).74 This raises the well-worn question of
whether international judges or arbitrators, even when not authorized to
act as amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono, in fact do so even
though they say they are acting pursuant to law. 5 To the extent such an
accusation is accurate, this adds another layer to the "fact-finding" issue.
A tribunal capable of fudging the "law" side of the equation may be just
as willing to fudge the "facts." No one here asks, for example, whether
an institutionalized dispute settlement process, such as the Iran-United
States claims process, contains elements that encourage non-legal
decisions and whether this impacts its "fact-finding." Does the laconic
manner in which Tribunal decisions state both the facts and the law
facilitate (sub rosa) determinations that no more than a certain percentage
of "U.S." victories, as in the dual nationality cases, are desirable to keep
Iran involved in the process? 76

73. For a survey of the criteria applied by tribunals to resolve territorial disputes, see
Athene L. W. Munkman, AdjudicationandAdjustment-InternationalJudicialDecisionand
the Settlement of Territorialand Boundary Disputes, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1972-73).
As Munkman acknowledges, whether the resulting generalizations evince "political" or
"legal" factors or merely a "penumbra of equities" is difficult to say. Id. at 105. Munkman
prefers to call the criteria applied in these cases "guidelines" as opposed to "rules." Id. at
109.
74. Dupuy, supra note 32, at 91.
75. See generally, William W. Park, National Law and CommercialJustice: Safeguarding ProceduralIntegrity in InternationalArbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv. 647 (1989); Louis
B. Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, 108 REcUEIL DES COURS 1,
41-59 (1963). Such a charge might be made, for example, of the World Court's "equitable
demarcation" in the Gulf of Maine Case or in connection with the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal's "split the baby" decisions in the choice of forum cases. Case Concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
246 (Oct. 12); T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 1 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 261 (Nov. 5, 1982). On
the latter, see Ted L. Stein, Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence: The Iranian-Forum
Clause Decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 78 AM. J.INT'L L. 1 (1984). For a
debate on whether there is a distinction between deciding a case ex aequo et bono and
deciding a case under the "equitable" application of law, see Munkman, supra note 73, at
105.
76. Compare Stein, supra note 75.
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No one in this book discusses the possibility that at least in certain
instances, arbitrators or international judges might see themselves
primarily as solvers of the dispute before them and not necessarily as
conclusive finders of the "real" facts or appliers of "real" law.' A
particular arbitral or judicial decision might be crafted, on the contrary,
to conceal the real elements of the dispute (both legal and factual) in
favor of a compromise solution pleasing to the parties or for other
reasons.7 8 To the extent that this is happening, the search for coherent
and consistent evidentiary rulings might prove an ultimately unrewarding,
self-delusional task.
III. Is THERE

AN INTERNATIONAL

Lex Evidentia?

If the first half of the title of this book raises undiscussed problems,
the second half of the title is nearly as troubling. What are the "international tribunals" with which we are concerned? To the extent that an
"international tribunal" can be defined in the negative-a forum for
adjudication not encompassed by the term "domestic tribunal"-it is clear
that this book does not purport to discuss adjudicative fora within
international organizations (e.g., the GATT and the International Labor
Organization),7 9 other types of dispute settlement (e.g., within the Law of
the Sea Convention 8° or the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement),8 ' U.N. Fact-Finding, 82 or the most common form of international

77. Compare Charles de Visscher's view that:
Settlement ex aequo et bono definitely fits the arbitral function better than the properly
judicial one. The arbitrator has to a very high degree the confidence of both parties
....
This occurs, for instance, when the parties express a desire to end old conflicts
which have been overtaken by the march of events. At such a moment, the insistence
upon the strict application of law must pass to the second rank; the parties envisage the
possibility of a new adjustment of their interests; their minds leave the past to turn
toward the future. In those cases they often resort to an arbitrator or an amiable
compositor rather than a judge.
Charles de Visscher, Cours Gefnefral des Principes de Droit International Public, 86
RECUEIL DES COURs 445 (1954-11) (text in French), as quoted and translatedby Sohn, supra
note 75, at 87.
78. See, e.g., Munkman, supra note 73, at 28-33 (discussing the arbitration decision in
Cordillera of the Andes Boundary, 9 R.I.A.A. 31 (1902)).
79. For a survey of GATT dispute settlement, see JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J.
DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 332-57 (2d ed. 1986).
For a survey of the ILO's adjudicative bodies, see WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN AMERICAN VIEW (1981).
80. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 of
October 7, 1982, arts. 186-191.
81. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), Chapter 19 and
annexes.
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adjudications: the hundreds of ad hoc arbitrations conducted in commercial settings under established rules such as UNCITRAL.83 To the extent
that this book ignores commercial arbitrations between non-State parties,
it reflects a long-standing categorical distinction between public and
private international dispute resolution which may no longer be viableY8
Certainly a book which aspires to be a worthy successor to Sandifer's
should either seek out all reported cases, regardless of forum, explain why
the tribunals chosen are representative of cases or fora not discussed, or
distinguish the fora chosen for inclusion from those which are not.
Without these explanations we are left with a grab-bag of examples,
in which the choices made for inclusion are sometimes as puzzling as the
exclusions,85 and which raise questions apart from comprehensiveness.
Even the limited range of international tribunals discussed in these pages
differ in many ways, including: by subject matter addressed (from
traditional "public" international law subjects, including human rights, to
commercial law, to administrative institutional law); by type of party
(States, corporations, international organizations, individuals); by nature
of forum (ad hoc, institutional, regional, or part of universal institution);
and by nature of process (amicable, adversarial, or something inbetween). Despite this range, there is little basis given here for the
suggestion made by numerous contributors that there is a lex evidentia
either emerging or established. 6 Although Sandifer had made a similar
claim, he also suggested that evidentiary rules were functionally based.
He argued that his emerging lex evidentia stemmed from the "distinctive
character" of international adjudication; thus, he suggested that international judges' reluctance to base a decision on technical exclusionary
grounds and their liberal admission of all types of evidence was due to
the complexity of issues raised in the international setting, the lapse of
time between international claims and any subsequent resolution, the long
82. See, e.g., Declaration on Fact-Findingby the United Nations in the Field of the
Maintenance of InternationalPeace and Security, G.A. Res. 46/59, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,

Agenda Item 131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/59 (1992).
83. For a thought-provoking discussion of the Iran-United States Tribunal as compared
to commercial international arbitration between private entities, see David D. Caron, The
Nature of the Iran-UnitedStates Claim Tribunal and the Evolving Structure ofInternational

Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1990).
84. See id. at 156. See also Ralph Steinhardt, The PrivatizationofPublic International
Law, 25 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 523 (1991) (casting doubt on "public"/"private"
international law distinctions).
85. Thus, we have a chapter on NGO fact-finding which scarcely involves a "tribunal"
as traditionally understood, and a chapter on domestic courts, which similarly stretches the
term "international."
86. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 53 (quote from Buergenthal); Holtzman,
supra note 36, at 132-33.
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distances between fora, documents and witnesses, and the involvement of
sovereign states and a corresponding desire to be sensitive to sovereign
He acknowledged that claims commissions where individuals
pride.
8
were claimants might prompt different evidentiary concerns.
Presumably, Sandifer would have been the first to recognize what
89
most of the contributors to this volume fail to acknowledge: that many
of the tribunals discussed here do not share the common characteristics
which facilitated Sandifer's original generalizations, and some do not
involve the participation of States as parties, nor implicate complex
°
issues, nor necessitate discovery over large distances of time and space.'
To the extent that international adjudication may generate generalizable
evidentiary rules at all, different types of tribunals may generate different
sets of rules in response to differing needs. The special needs and
circumstances of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, for example,
may facilitate the "judicial activism" which Holtzmann praises in
91 On the
connection with Tribunal decisions on corporate nationality.
other hand, a tribunal not faced with the pressure of settling hundreds of
corporate nationality claims might be less willing to depart from the
traditionally timid approach many arbitrators have taken regarding such
doctrines as judicial notice.' A tribunal which does not routinely deal
with sovereign assertions of fact, compared to one asked to adjudicate
inter-State complaints, may employ less deferential approaches to the
impeachment and cross-examination of witnesses generally and may also
be less reluctant to engage in its own fact-finding or to appoint its own

87. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 3-5, 24-26. Interestingly, Franck, in his chapter on the
ICJ, distinguishes that Court from domestic courts on similar grounds. Franck, supra note
27, at 21-22. Not all international tribunals discussed in this volume share the ICJ's
distinctive qualities.
88. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 4.
89. One exception to this is Ress' chapter on the European Court of Justice. Ress
explicitly refuses to make evidentiary generalizations even within one tribunal across the
different types of actions discussed.
90. Thus, Sandifer indicated that "[i]t is of primary importance to keep in mind these
unique features of international judicial proceedings in examining the rules of evidence
applied by international tribunals. Rules drawn from the general practice of these tribunals
can be generalized only with caution." SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 35. His book often
distinguishes between evidentiary rules applied by different types of international tribunals.

See, e.g., id at 119-208.
91. See Holtzmann, supra note 36, at 106-10. It is not clear whether generalizations
can be validly made regarding the likelihood of evidentiary judicial activism by institutionalized as opposed to ad hoc arbitrations. Munkman, for example, found that institutionalized
courts sometime displayed "greater caution in their reasoning or in their decisions" regarding
territorial or boundary disputes and for that reason suggested that ad hoc or regional
arbitrations might be preferable in some instances. Munkman, supra note 73, at 114.
92. Compare SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 382-97.
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experts.9 3 One which faces a situation in which all the evidence is in the
control of only one party might be inclined to adopt more stringent rules
94
of discovery, particularly when the material is otherwise not accessible.
On the other hand, a tribunal with specialized expertise might have less
need to rely on party-generated evidence or on the appointment of
experts, 95 and may provide a reviewing court with little opportunity for
review of evidentiary issues. 96 One could go on and on. Despite
suggestions made in this volume, the jury is still out on whether it is
feasible to generate a "model set of evidentiary rules" for general use by
international tribunals. 97 Nor is it clear, especially given Thomas
Carbonneau's chapter in this collection, that it is advisable to do so.
Carbonneau argues, contrary to the suggestions made in particular by
Selby, that it is not advisable to have a more regularized set of procedures for handling evidence in the arbitral setting.98 Carbonneau opposes
the "adversarialization" of international arbitration because of the threat
posed to the advantages offered by arbitration: flexibility, informality,
and speed.99 Carbonneau's arguments echo those offered by U.S. courts
for rejecting the applicability of either the federal rules of civil procedure
Carbonneau
or the federal rules of evidence to arbitral proceedings."
takes a dim view of the U.S. adversarial process, suggesting that its

93. Compare Sandifer's discussion of sovereign assertions. Id. at 397-402.
94. See Monica P. McCabe, Arbitral Discovery and the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal Experience, 20 INT'L LAw. 499, 510-11 (1986). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1).
95. Schwebel and Highet suggest as much in their praise of Chamber proceedings. See
Stephen M. Schwebel, Introduction: Three Cases of Fact-Findingby the International
Court of Justice, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 1, 4 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1992); Highet, supra note 28, at 47.
96. GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 367 (rev. ed. 1991).
97. A more promising route may be to encourage further work on evidentiary rules
among certain types of international tribunals with common features, and specifically on
particular evidentiary issues within that subset of fora. See, e.g., Michael Straus, The
Practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in Receiving Evidence from Parties and from
Experts, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 57 (1986); James R. Holbein, Evidentiary Issues Under the U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement and the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement,
in Workshop Materials for Annual Spring Meeting, American Bar Association (1993)
(forthcoming) (copy on file with author).
98. In so limiting his target, Carbonneau argues that ICJ adjudication "is completely
different from the private forms of international adjudication." Carbonneau, supra note 54,
at 160 n.l1. Carbonneau is also presumably taking issue with the notion that there is one
lex evidentia which governs all these tribunals.
99. For a decidedly less enthusiastic portrayal of arbitration with respect to these factors,
see Samuel V. Goekjian, The Conduct ofInternationalArbitration, 2 LAW. AMERICAS 409

(1979).
100. See, e.g., W. Michael Tupman, Discovery and Evidence in U.S. Arbitration: The
Prevailing Views, ARB. J., Mar. 1989, at 27 and cites contained therein.
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sole objective is to have the client's interests triumph essentially without
regard to the financial, ethical, and human costs that might accompany
the litigation. It is not merely a form of debate or a means of expressing
disagreement, but rather a single-minded, unrelenting, and strident
advocacy for the unilateral disposition of the case. It breeds distrust
among all the actors involved, and-as a consequence-demands
elaborate procedures and numerous opportunities for challenge ....
This unique brand of trial procedures has literally paralyzed the
administration of justice in the United States. It has made justice
financially prohibitive and inaccessible, and has undermined the integrity
of law and of the legal profession."'
Carbonneau argues that the plea to have more refined rules of procedure
is really an attempt to "align arbitral proceedings with adversarial
practices,"'" and that this would flood international tribunals with
advocacy-generated facts, turning arbitrators into "mere managers of the
parties' adversarial disagreement."' 0 3 He contends that arbitral rules such
as UNCITRAL's were the product of an "already existing international
consensus on arbitral procedure" and do not require supplementation or
modification."° He argues that nothing needs fixing since there is a
"sufficient track record of arbitral performance" showing "sound
procedural judgment" and little evidence of abuses in terms of discovery,
fact-finding, or award. 5
Carbonneau's chapter enlivens Fact-Finding Before International
Tribunals because it is virtually the only instance in which one author
manages to engage the other contributors in a battle of orthodoxies.
Nonetheless, Carbonneau's strident dissent is less illuminating than it
could have been simply because he appears to be fighting a straw man.
Neither Selby nor anyone else in this volume is proposing the use of
technical exclusionary evidentiary rules, such as those excluding hearsay,
in any international tribunal. Selby herself argues against "merely
technical solutions. ''t °6 What Selby and some of the other contributors
are proposing are mere supplementary rules of evidence and procedure to
compel evidence more effectively and to assess credibility more reliably

101. Carbonneau, supra note 54, at 163-64.
102. Id. at 165.
103. Id. at 166.
104. Id. at 165.
105. Id. at 166.

106. Selby, supra note 40, at 143.
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and consistently.' 7 Carbonneau's assertion that this modest goal is "a
first step in the direction of acquiescing to the adversarial ethic's
insatiable and self-aggrandizing logic" is neither convincing nor an
argument.
His further blanket assertion, unsupported by any evidence-that all
is well with the procedure followed by international arbitrators-flies in
the face of abundant criticism of international arbitrations by numerous
academics and practitioners. As anyone who has examined the decisions
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the "most significant arbitral
body in history,"'' 8 can attest, not all of those decisions or the underlying
procedures evince the efficiency and fairness which Carbonneau
acknowledges are the ultimate goals. Legitimately dissatisfied claimants
before that Tribunal exist, as is evidenced by the decisions on dual
nationality rendered prior to Judge Holtzmann's dissent in MohajerShojaee v. Iran.19 The lax, and some would say unequal, application of
evidentiary rules at the Tribunal, such as with respect to sanctions for
non-compliance with discovery orders, has often worked to the detriment
of U.S. claimants unable to secure documentary or other evidence left in
Iran.Y0 Tribunal decisions as to evidentiary issues have not always been
consistently applied in the Tribunal's practice, and its overall track record
as to "sound procedural judgement" still remains to be compiled."'

107. Il at 145. See also Louis H. Willenken, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration, LITIG.,
Winter 1980, at 16; McCabe, supra note 94.
108. FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at vii.
109. Mohajer-Shojaee v. Iran, 25 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. at 201-11.
110. See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 94, at 519 n.124.
111. See, e.g., Seismograph Service Corp. NIOC, Case No. 443, Awd. No. 420-443-3
(Dec. 22, 1988)(concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Brower complaining of the
chamber's "clear and unexplained departure from rigorous evidentiary standards" which had
been applied in other cases). For the ICJ's occasionally severe criticisms of the way
arbitrators interpreted and carried out their mandate in a particular instance, see Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12). As for the ICJ
itself, there is no shortage of criticism of its evidentiary and procedural practices. Schwebel
and Franck (in this volume) are not the only ones who have cast doubt on the Court's
abilities to handle complex facts. See, e.g., Tes6n, supra note 62. And not all commentators have been as laudatory about the Court's fact-finding in the ELSI Case as Highet.
Compare Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International
Court of Justice, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 391 (1991) (but note that Mr. Murphy, who appeared
on behalf of the United States in that case, is arguably as partisan as Highet who appeared
on behalf of Italy). Nor has the World Court been especially adept with respect to the
handling of non-documentary forms of evidence. See, e.g., SANDIFER, supra note 4, at
341-42,466-67 (critiquing the Court's handling of expert evidence in the South-West Africa
Cases). For a severe critique of the Court's procedural decision to dismiss El Salvador's
action to intervene at the early jurisdictional stages of the Nicaragua Case, see Christine
Chinkin & Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of InternationalDispute Resolution, 7 OHIo ST.
J. DiSP. REsO.L. 39, 71-72 (1991).

Michigan Journalof International Law

[Vol. 14:399

Moreover, evidentiary flaws may undermine the subsequent enforcement
of arbitration awards, particularly apart from the Iran-United States claims
courts have the power to overturn arbitral
process, whenever domestic
2
errors.'
awards for certain
To the extent that Carbonneau fears that supplementary rules would
undermine arbitrator autonomy, the answer to the question of whether
parties or arbitrators have greater autonomy in these proceedings is in the
eye of the beholder. Not all evidentiary practices point in one direction
on this issue. Sandifer has argued, for instance, that international
tribunals' liberal admission of evidence puts parties in greater control of
evidentiary issues as compared to domestic courts (with the "disadvantage
the door to carelessness and looseness" in dealing with these
of opening
113
issues).
Carbonneau also discusses arbitration as an undifferentiated mass-as
if all arbitral settings present the same choices between adversarial and
non-adversarial processes. Neither he nor those whose views he
opposes" 4 discuss the possibility that the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, an admittedly unique institution, may present a different set of
challenges. In particular, Carbonneau's view that "trust must be vested
in the arbitrators to control the process and to provide sanctions for a
party's breach of its adjudicatory commitment and duty"--while perhaps
sound as applied to some bilateral ad hoc arbitrations between consenting
parties-sounds far-fetched as applied to the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. That Tribunal was created in an atmosphere of severe mistrust
and its institutionalization reflects its origins. The Tribunal is today an
institutionalized process for the resolution of thousands of disputes among
three separate chambers of arbitrators in existence for over a decade. The
dynamics of such an institutionalized mechanism-where arbitrators
might be tempted to trade off one case for another, where entire
categories of claims might be decided by one procedural or evidentiary
decision, where no possible alternative fora exist, where enforcement of
any subsequent award is reasonably certain with little possibility for resort
112. Alan R. Gilbert, Annotation, Refusal of Arbitrators to Receive Evidence, or to
Permit Briefs or Arguments, on ParticularIssues, as Grounds for Relief From Award, 75
A.L.R.3D 132 (1977). Compare UNCITRAL art. 36(1) (permitting correction of award due

to "errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors, or any errors of a similar
nature"); McCabe, supra note 94, at 528. See also Park, supra note 75, at 707 (arguing in
favor of such review by domestic courts on the grounds that the "goals of speed and finality
sought by winners" should not be pursued at "the expense of procedural fairness expected

by losers").
113.

SANDIFER,

supra note 4, at 42.

114. See, e.g., BARRY E.

(1991).

CARTER

&

PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

56-75
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to power external to the Tribunal," 5 and where the parties are conditioned
to make arguments based on prior Tribunal (or at least Chamber)
precedents-are perhaps more similar to those operating in domestic
tribunals than to those governing non-institutionalized arbitrations." 6
Further, the full Tribunal already modified the UNCITRAL rules in light
of comments by the United States and Iran when the Tribunal was first
established;" 7 that these rules might need to be further modified for use
by that Tribunal in light of its extensive practice and to create the
conditions for more consistent application of evidentiary rules appears
unexceptional. Indeed, the argument that the current version of the
UNCITRAL rules now in use by the Tribunal is somehow sacrosanct
goes against the consensual nature of arbitration; there are few limitations
on parties' choices with respect to procedural or evidentiary rules." 8
Whether similar or radically differing supplementation of the
evidentiary rules before other international tribunals is advisable or
needed can only be resolved on a tribunal by tribunal basis. Neither
Carbonneau's overstated arguments against such changes nor other
commentators' sometimes over-generalized arguments in favor of
supplementary rules for all international tribunals are convincingly made.
Carbonneau's arguments are also unfortunate in that they discourage
comparisons between domestic and international approaches to evidentiary
issues. Since, for Carbonneau, arbitrators have little or nothing to learn
from the "American-born due process cancer" ' 9 that pervades domestic
adversarial proceedings, there is little point in engaging in comparisons
between, for example, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's handling
of hearsay and a U.S. federal court's, and no such discussions appear in
this book. Most of the commentators here approach their tribunal's
evidentiary questions as if they were unconnected to the domestic legal
systems in which they operate or in which the arbitrators or judges were
trained. Such a perspective deprives the book of a richness evident in

115. See Caron, supra note 83, at 129.
116. Nor is the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal the only institutionalized arbitral
mechanism. For example, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement also contains
such dispute settlement provisions. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, reprinted
in JOHN D. RICHARD & RIGHARD G. DEARDEN, THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREE-

MENT: FINAL TEXT AND ANALYSIS (1988). Cf.Holtzmann's claim that the Tribunal's factfinding procedures "are not sui generis, but are rather a likely source of guidance in other
arbitrations." Holtzmann, supra note 36, at 132.
117. See Caron, supra note 83, at 142-43.
118. Cf. Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican Refining Corp., 296 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1962) (suggesting that the parties should not have chosen to submit their dispute to
arbitration had they wished to have exclusionary rules for hearsay apply).
119. Carbonneau, supra note 54, at 166.
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Sandifer's text which is replete with references to whether international
evidentiary rules more closely resemble common law or civil law
approaches to the same question. Sandifer's justification for these
references is that:
International tribunals, however, no matter how liberal they may be in
the treatment of evidence as to matters of form, submission, and
admissibility, are undoubtedly inclined to subject it to the tests the
members of the tribunal are accustomed12to use in evaluating its weight
in the countries from which they come. 0
The extensive practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and
its diverse body of arbitrators would have been a productive place to test
Sandifer's provocative thesis, and it is a shame that no such attempt is
made here. In addition, Sandifer gives a general breakdown of the
comparative influence of "Anglo-American" and "civil law" evidentiary
concepts, suggesting that international tribunals' approaches to the
admission of hearsay, the type of evidence preferred (written versus oral),
the burden of proof, the taking of testimonial evidence, and the use of
experts more closely parallels civil law procedure but that common law
approaches prevail in the use of affidavits, the deference to party
autonomy in the free production of evidence, the best evidence rule, and
concepts of judicial notice.121 Whether Sandifer's sweeping generalizations still hold true, at least in terms of the particular tribunals discussed
here, would also have been an interesting question to address."
Carbonneau's harsh condemnation of the U.S. adversarial approach
notwithstanding, this reviewer is not convinced that international judges
and arbitrators have nothing to learn from, for example, U.S. courts'
handling of evidentiary issues. As Wigmore once noted, both domestic

120. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 13.

121. Id. at 468-69. The assumption that domestic rules influence international
proceedings is not an unusual one. The International Bar Association's "Supplementary
Rules Governing the Presentation and Reception of Evidence in International Commercial
Arbitration" are expressly intended to apply to cases where "on party and its counsel come
from a country whose system of law and procedure has its origins in the common law, and
where the other party and its counsel come from a civil law and procedure country."
International Bar Association: Supplementary Rules Governing the Presentation and
Reception of Evidence in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 349 (1984).
Yet the closest one gets to domestic analogies in Fact-Finding Before International
Tribunalsare Selby's and Holtzmann's brief acknowledgements that Tribunal procedures owe
something to both the common law and civil law traditions of the arbitrators. Holtzmann,
supra note 36, at 133; Selby, supra note 40, at 137.
122. Useful comparative work such as Mirjan Damaska's Of Hearsayand Its Analogues
at the international level would also lessen the current divide between groups of scholars
(international/comparative, domestic/international) so detrimental to useful insight. Mirjan
Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REv. 425 (1992).
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and international tribunals share the same basic underlying principles."2
The purposes of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, after all, are the
same as those which Carbonneau affirms for international arbitration;
they too are intended to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay, secure
fairness, and promote a just resolution.124 It would appear that all of us
could learn even from the ways the operation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence fall short of these goals.
Fact-FindingBefore InternationalTribunals is not a path-breaking
book. The book is premised on distinctions between facts and law and
between domestic and international adjudicative fora which raise more
questions than the commentators attempt to answer. Despite the
symposium format, most of the contributors in this volume cross in the
night, without engaging one another or drawing comparisons across the
various tribunals discussed. The authors of the ICJ chapters, for example,
while sharing certain assumptions, do not challenge one another even
when the opportunity presents itself. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the
presumed differences between Schwebel and Highet concerning the
relevant facts in the ELSI Case,1 25 these two contributors' do not address
their differences, despite the ostensible importance to the issue of accurate
fact-finding by that Court. Moreover, the ICJ authors make no attempt
to discuss the unique aspects of the ICJ in light of the contributions by
others in this volume. Such comparisons probably would have been more
intriguing than the subjects which are addressed here. Certainly, it is
plausible to assume that the ICJ's jurisdiction, including its presumptive
mandate to interpret the constitutive instrument of the world's foremost
deliberative body, the United Nations, and that Court's special prestige
and history, may impact on its fact-finding potential, as compared to a
tribunal with a more limited, or a more "commercial" mandate, such as
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal or a binational panel under the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The contributors' failure to take up
the challenge of talking across these traditional divides, namely the one
separating "commercial" arbitration of "private" international law from

123. SANDIFER, supra note 4, at 31 n.78, citing JOHN H. WIGMORE,
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

A TREATISE ON THE
§ 4n (3d ed. 1940).

See also Holtzmann, supra note 36, at 132 ("[i]nternational arbitration is typically an

exercise in comparative procedural law").
124. FED. R. EVID. 102.

125. Compare Schwebel's view of the facts in the ELSI Case, Elettronica Sincula S.p.A.
(ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel) with
Highet's views of these facts. Highet, supra note 3, at 33-79.
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ICJ adjudication of "public" international law, casts doubt on the general
conclusion that a lex evidentia, shared by all international tribunals,
awaits discovery.
Nevertheless, because Fact-FindingBefore InternationalTribunals,
like Sandifer's work, raises anew the possibility of such a lex evidentia
lying in wait for those patient enough to wade in the relatively uncharted
waters at the intersection of evidence and international law, the book is
likely to prove tantalizing even to the skeptical. It is, after all, difficult
not to be sympathetic about anything which could improve the prospects
of international adjudication.
For the reasons suggested in this review, the dilemmas standing in the
way of the approach taken by the contributors to this volume (and
previously by Sandifer) are daunting. It may not be wise or feasible to
begin the search for generalizable rules from the ground up, based on
inductive analysis of recorded (and perhaps purposefully misleading)
decisions rendered across diverse settings. As discussed here, it is also
troublesome to premise the search on the simplistic assumption that rules
which let the judges get the "facts" right are necessarily the best rules
with which to encourage international adjudication or to improve
compliance with existing decisions.
But as Selby and others in this volume, including Carbonneau,
sometimes imply, we might begin from a different standpoint. We might
assume that international adjudicative processes gain greater acceptance,
credibility or legitimacy to the extent those subject to these processes
regard them as procedurally fair. And if the process by which arbitrators
or judges reach their outcomes is either as significant or more significant
than the actual outcomes reached (i.e., whether the judge got the "facts"
or the "law" right), perhaps a better way to discover generalizable rules
might be deductive, inferring these rules from those factors most likely
to produce proceedings which would be perceived as fair. Why not, then,
look to those who have long been engaged in wide-ranging empirical
work in social psychology designed to test the hypothesis that adjudicative decisions gain acceptance because of subjective judgments of
procedural justice? At the very least, some of this work, which tests
different procedures and techniques for resolving disputes from the
perspective of peoples from different cultures, might provide us with
valuable alternative perspectives on the types of evidentiary rules or
procedures which might be expected to impact most positively on
judgments about procedural justice. Tyler and Lind's path-breaking
survey of studies in this field, The Social Psychology of Procedural
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Justice,126 might be a useful starting point. Existing empirical work might
suggest, for example, that among the factors likely to prompt favorable
reactions to an adjudicative process are confidence in the competence of
the judges, predictability in the rules, a high degree of party participation
in the process, finality, low adjudication costs, and consistency. It might
also suggest, alternatively, that even such conclusions at the highest levels
of generality can only be made concerning some types of cases and under
some types of circumstances. Either way, an analysis of how these
factors relate to fact-finding procedures followed in international tribunals
may ultimately lead to a worthy successor to Sandifer's work as well as
to this volume.

126. E.
JUSTICE

ALLAN LIND

(1988).
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